Although criminologists in the US and Europe continue to explore issues of immigration, race, and ethnicity in the context of crime, they have yet to examine the detention of asylum seekers. Still, this is a social phenomenon that requires serious consideration since in many instances such policies and practices violate international standards for the protection of refugees. This work takes a critical look at the detention of persons fleeing persecution by situating it an expanding culture of control stoked by the criminology of the other. The article offers evidence of a steady increase in the reliance on detention of asylum seekers in the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy. Indications of a conservative shift in criminological thought affecting crime-and asylum-policy are addressed alongside concerns for human rights in a post-September 11 world.
Introduction
In a recent and refreshing trend, criminologists are once again exploring the significance of crime, punishment, and social control in the context of culture, thereby expanding the analytical lens through which criminal justice systems are understood. David Garland (2001) , a notable voice in the dialogue on crime and culture, reminds us that major social transformations in the US and UK since the 1970s have shaped popular views of lawbreaking and subsequent political responses leading to the adoption of tough on crime tactics. In the US, the most striking product of the culture of control is mass imprisonment (Austin et al., 2003; Chivigny, 2003; Useem et al., 2003) . The rush to imprison reflects a cultural disposition that supports a greater reliance on prisons while ignoring the long-term detriment that mass incarceration imposes on society, communities, and prisoners (Garland, 2002; Blomberg and Cohen, 2003; Tonry, 2004) . The uncritical acceptance of a widespread use of prisons in the US-as embodied in a culture of control-extends to other forms of imprisonment, including the detention of undocumented immigrants commonly referred to as illegal aliens.
Especially for protracted periods of time, detention is among the gravest acts the state can take against people. The seriousness of detention is even greater under circumstances in which persons are held not on criminal or immigration charges but rather after fleeing persecution. The routine practice of detaining asylum seekers in the US, the UK, and Continental Europe, worries human rights organizations, especially since it clashes with the United Nations Convention on Refugees. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US, along with many of its European allies, ratified international and domestic laws requiring them to provide a safe haven for people who demonstrate a credible fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, national origin, social group or politics. Fifty years later, human rights advocates are distressed to find that western nations have rolled back their commitment to refugees and those seeking political asylum. The American Civil Liberties Union (UCLU) has been critical of the US government in this respect: 'Although hundreds of thousands of political refugees have been admitted into the US since World War II, our government has too often been guided by political, rather than humanitarian, considerations and countless numbers of people have been returned to their countries of origin only to be jailed, tortured and even killed' (ACLU, 1998: 1) . 1 While criminologists are turning crucial attention to issues of immigration, race, ethnicity, and crime (Wacquant, 1999; Angel-Ajani, 2003; Calavita, 2003; Melossi, 2003; Young, 2003a) , they have yet to delve into the detention of persons fleeing persecution. David Smith recently acknowledged the significance of this problem pointing out that: 'The politicization of crime and punishment combines with a successful effort by far right parties to define migration and asylum seekers as a focal political issue ' (2004: 5) . Indeed, popular views casting suspicion on asylum seekers parallel conservative criminological thought embodied in a culture of control. Correspondingly, the practice of detaining asylum seekers is facilitated by a criminalization process that marginalizes those pursuing asylum; in many instances, those seeking sanctuary are perceived as bogus and not entitled to asylum (Kaye, 1998; Refaie, 2001; Cohen, 2002) . This work explores how the culture of control is spreading from the US and Britain to Continental Europe and the adverse impact that it is having on asylum seekers, especially in a post-September 11 world.
2 While examining specifically the practice of detaining asylum seekers in the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, implications for human rights are discussed throughout. 3 The article begins with an overview of the chief aspects of a control culture, particularly as they pertain to the confinement of those fleeing persecution.
Culture of control in contemporary society
In The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, David Garland (2001) explores conservative social trends in the US and UK that have contributed tremendously to punitive responses to crime. While departing from correctionalist criminology and its aim to remedy the causes of criminality, tough on crime initiatives create an array of contradictions. Paradoxically, the US-a nation committed to individual freedoms and civil liberties-has become the world's leader in incarceration due to its commitment to mass imprisonment. Likewise, American public support for such archaic sanctions as the death penalty and chain gangs is a manifestation of expressive punishments symbolizing collective outrage. As we shall elaborate on further, the unnecessary and costly detention of undocumented immigrants in general, and asylum seekers in particular, rarely registers public concern among Americans in large part because the use of confinement and other expressive punishments are so ubiquitous.
Expressive punishments embedded in American and British culture draw heavily on the emotional toll of crime. Criminal victimization, as characterized in the British Labour Party's slogan 'Everyone's a Victim', has become a collective experience stoked by the media and politicians realizing that they have tapped successfully into a public psyche consumed with undifferentiated anxiety over economic insecurity, racial tension, and a host of other social issues, including immigration and asylum seeking (Bottoms, 1995; Chambliss, 1999; Stenson and Sullivan, 2000) . As a consequence, punishments imbued with emotion are commonplace as citizens endorse tough on crime sanctions (e.g., 3-strikes legislation and mandatory minimum sentences; see Greenberg, 2002) . It is telling that the prison-an institution widely condemned as a failure by liberals and conservatives alike-would emerge as a key symbol for a culture committed to control and order (see Bottoms and Preston, 1983; Sparks et al., 1996) . The use of prisons for the expressed purpose of retribution, no matter what the social and financial costs, reflects a shift in criminological thinking that has gained prominence since the 1970s (see Young 2003a Young , 2003b . In the early 1990s, the British government embarked on a campaign oddly called 'prison works', in which Home Secretary Michael Howard boasted the virtues of incarceration. Howard's 'prison works' crusade was a response to his predecessors who conceded that 'imprisonment is an expensive way of making bad people worse' (Home Office, 1990; see Baker, 1996; Windlesham, 1996; Dunbar and Langdon, 1998) . The detention of asylum seekers combines the 'prison works' mentality with the emotional valence of the asylum issue given that for years the British public has expressed anger-moral panic-over what it perceives to be an influx of bogus asylum seekers (Cohen, 1994; Bralo, 1998) .
The culture of control marks another notable, albeit regressive, development in criminological thought, namely its emphasis on the consequences of crime rather than its causes. As a result, the focus shifts from the crime problem to the criminal problem, paving the way for an emergent criminology of the other in which lawbreakers-and asylum seekers-are characterized as menacing strangers who threaten not only individual safety but also the entire social order. Capturing the essence of the criminology of the other, Garland elaborates: This is a criminology that trades in images, archetypes, and anxieties, rather than in careful analyses and research findings. In its deliberate echoing of public concerns and media biases and its focus on the most worrisome threats, it is, in effect, a politicized discourse of the collective unconscious, though it claims to be altogether realist and 'common-sensical' in contrasts to 'academic theories'. In its standard tropes and rhetorical invocations, this political discourse relies upon an archaic criminology of the criminal type, the alien other. (2001: 135) That way of thinking about crime-and asylum seeking-draws on popular fears and resentments in ways that perpetuate harsh penal sanctions, including the detention of those pursuing sanctuary. While the older social democratic criminology has not vanished completely, it tends to be drowned out by the shrill emotionalism that has consumed the crime issue. In sum, the criminology of the other is anti-modern in nature insofar as it rejects modern concepts of crime and progressive methods of dealing with social problems, such as confronting racial and socioeconomic inequality. Conforming to the precepts of moral panic (Cohen, 2002) , the criminology of the other re-dramatizes crime, reinforces a disaster mentality, and retreats into intolerance and authoritarianism. In doing so, it clings to criminal stereotypes resonating with racism and classism, and that sense of 'otherness' reinforces an 'us versus them' worldview (see Young, 1999; Lea, 2002) . The criminology of the other is 'deeply illiberal in its assumption that certain criminals [and certain asylum seekers] are "simply wicked" and in this respect intrinsically different from the rest of us' (Garland, 2001: 184) .
Controversies in detaining asylum seekers
A critical understanding of the significance of confining asylum seekers, especially in light of an expanding culture of control, warrants a close examination of detention policies and practices in western nations (see Koser and Lutz, 1998; Sassen, 1999) . In this section, controversies over detaining persons fleeing persecution are presented as they have emerged in the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy.
United States
The tragic events of September 11 have had a tremendous impact around the world and particularly on American society (Cole and Dempsey, 2002; Ratner, 2003) . Regrettably, the government's initial response to the threat of terrorism has been fraught with civil and human rights infractions, especially in light of profiling and detentions concealed by a thick wall of secrecy (Human Rights Watch, 2002; General Accounting Office, 2003) . The crackdown on undocumented immigrants and foreigners also extends to another vulnerable subset of the immigrant population, namely, asylum seekers. Along with an undifferentiated fear of terrorism, crime, and nonwhite immigrants, there is growing suspicion that under existing asylum proceedings: 'People would show up, ask for asylum and then disappear, and of course stay in this country indefinitely' (Congressman Lamar Smith, R-Tx, quoted in Tulsky, 2000: EV-3). However, experts insist that using asylum seeking as a means of gaining entry to the US is a tremendously high risk for terrorists because all asylum applicants are fingerprinted, thoroughly interrogated, and face the prospects of months or years in detention (Amnesty International, 2003) .
Between September 11 2001 and December 2003, more than 15,300 asylum seekers were detained at US airports and borders. From the port of entry asylum seekers are transported to jail often in handcuffs, and usually without any clear understanding of why they were being detained. In detention, once they pass a screening interview, asylum seekers are legally eligible to be paroled if they satisfy the DHS parole criteria (i.e., community ties, no risk to the community, and that identity can be established). However, in practice, even asylum seekers who meet those criteria remain in detention (Asylum Protection News 22, 2004) . Immigration officials too often ignore or selectively apply the parole criteria, which exist only in guideline form rather than formal regulations. Compounding matters, when an asylum seeker's parole request is denied by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials, they have no meaningful recourse; they cannot appeal the decision to an independent authority, or even an immigration judge (Asylum Protection News 21, 2003; Jones, 2003; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2004) . 4 Since the attacks of September 11, other strict measures have been established that adversely affect asylum seekers in the US, including Operation Liberty Shield and the Blanket Detention Order of 2003.
Human rights advocates are appalled by a recent program officially titled Operation Liberty Shield that was initiated by the DHS on the eve of the war with Iraq. That program requires detention of asylum seekers from 33 countries where Al Qaeda has been known to operate. Under Operation Liberty Shield, even asylum seekers who did not raise any suspicions of security or flight risks were slated for detention for the duration of their asylum proceedings (estimated by the Department to be six months or significantly longer if the case was appealed). Consequently, many of them would be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to request release through parole (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 2003) .
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Adding to the government's escalating war on terror, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a profoundly significant measure on 17 April, 2003. Under that directive, illegal immigrants, including asylum seekers, can be held indefinitely without bond if their cases present national security concerns. Ashcroft firmly stated: 'Such national security considerations clearly constitute a reasonable foundation for the exercise of my discretion to deny release on bond' (Anderson, 2003: EV-1) . Whereas the blanket detention order is framed as being necessary for maintaining national security, the actual case involves a Haitian asylum-seeker, David Joseph. The DHS, the agency that now has authority over most immigration matters, sought the opinion from the Attorney General after the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld a judge's decision to release Joseph on US$2500 bond. Ashcroft argued: 'national security would be threatened if the release triggered a huge wave of immigrants to attempt to reach US shores. That would overtax the already-strained Coast Guard, Border Patrol and other agencies that are busy trying to thwart terror attacks' (Anderson, 2003: EV-1) . The State Department weighed into the controversy, claiming that Haiti has become a staging point for non-Haitians considered security threats (i.e., Pakistanis and Palestinians) to enter the US.
Whereas most of the immigration issues have been transferred to the DHS, the measure promises to centralize further the power of the Attorney General in the area of asylum seeking. Human rights groups and immigration attorneys swiftly opposed the blanket detention order. Amnesty International denounced Ashcroft's ruling to hold groups of asylum-seekers and other non-citizens in detention indefinitely, noting that the provision extends to those who pose no danger to the US. 'To suggest that all Haitian asylum-seekers pose a threat to US national security, as Attorney General Ashcroft has done, strains credulity and makes a mockery of our immigration system', said Amnesty International USA's executive director Bill Schulz. 'Ordering asylum-seekers to remain locked up simply because of their nationality is tantamount to discrimination and a violation of international standards' (Amnesty International, 2003: EV-1). Human rights organizations acknowledge the US government's obligation to protect national security against terrorism and supports legitimate means of doing so. Still, the blanket detention policy violates international standards specifying that the detention of asylum seekers be limited to exceptional cases under law. Furthermore, governments have the burden of demonstrating the need for detaining of asylum-seekers in prompt and fair individualized hearings before a judicial or similar authority (Amnesty International, 2003; see Keller, 2003) .
United Kingdom
Most European Union states are now bound by the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 5 of the Convention guarantees the right of liberty and the security of the person. However, the Convention does permit the detention of individuals to facilitate removal (see Schuster, 2000) . Until the 1990s there were no permanent detention centres in Britain, because detention was an exceptional measure. When implemented for large groups of people, barracks or similar buildings or camps would usually be commandeered, as happened for example during the two world wars. Otherwise individuals would be detained in prisons or, in the case of asylum seekers mostly from Sri Lanka in 1987, on the ferry The Earl William (see Cohen, 1994; United Nations, 2002) .
The detention of persons subject to migration control in the UK was first codified under the 1920 Aliens Act, and then elaborated further under the 1972 Immigration Act. This Act empowered immigration officers to detain, among others: persons arriving in the UK while a decision is being taken on whether to grant leave to enter; those refused leave to enter or suspected of having been refused leave to enter pending directions for their removal; illegal entrants and those reasonably suspected of being illegal entrants, pending directions to remove and actual removal; and those found to be in breach of conditions attached to their leave to enter (including overstaying). Powers to detain are very wide and there is no automatic or independent scrutiny of the lawfulness, appropriateness or length of detention.
New detention centre rules were introduced in 2001 covering matters including conditions in the centres and the provision of reasons for detention. Their introduction is significant in that they make statutory provision for rules by which detention centres must be run. However, the operating standards that flesh out the rules have yet to be completed and there are significant differences between centres. People detained under the 1972 Act were usually over-stayers (people who had entered on a tourist, visitors or other visa and remained after their visa had expired), frequently brought to the attention of the immigration authorities through denunciations, traffic accidents, or crimes (as victims or perpetrators). Prior to 1988, asylum seekers averaged approximately 5000 per year and were rarely deported or detained. Those granted the status of refugee tended to come as part of a resettlement programme or came from the Soviet Bloc and were readily granted asylum. Occasionally people would be stopped on entry and detained awaiting removal, but at any one time there would usually be between 200-300 people in detention. This situation changed significantly in the 1990s. From 250 people in early 1993, the numbers of people detained increased to just over 2260 10 years later (Schuster, 2003a (Schuster, , 2003b .
As the numbers increased, it was decided to build a facility to house detainees. The first purpose built camp for migration detainees in the UK was opened in Campsfield (186 places), Oxfordshire in November 1993, but the detention estate has really only expanded significantly under the present New Labour government, who, around the 10th anniversary of the centre, reversed a decision to close the centre and decided instead to add another 100 places. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act stepped up the practice of detention, massively increasing the number of places. Since the Act came into force, three new purpose built detention centres have opened (at Oakington, March 2000-up to 400 places primarily for families; Harmondsworth, October 2001-530 places, including some for families; and at Yarl's Wood, November 2001-900 places), Lindholme RAF base (110 places) has been redesignated a removal centre, Dungavel prison (150 places) has become a detention centre and a closed induction centre has opened at Dover (20 places). There are also holding centres at Waterloo, Heathrow, and Manchester Airport. In the first nine months of operation (between March and December 2000) Oakington received 3000 cases. In 2001, the number of asylum applicants passing through Oakington had tripled to 9125 (Heath and Hill, 2002) . The flagship centre at Yarl's Wood in Bedfordshire was partially destroyed by a fire in February 2002, but partially reopened in September 2003 to hold approximately 200 women and there are plans to extend it further. In spite of government promises to end the practice, asylum seekers continue to be housed in prisons; moreover, NGOs report that removal from a detention centre to a prison is sometimes used to punish detainees. All the detention centres, except Haslar and Lindholme, are run by private security firms, such as GSL (formerly Group 4) and Wackenhut. Haslar and Lindholme are prison establishments and run by the prison service.
In the UK, unlike most other European countries, and contrary to the recommendations of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which visited the UK in 1998, there is no legal limit to the time a person may be held (see United Nations, 2002). The longest known period is the detention of an Indian national-Karamjit Singh Chahal (six years and two months). He was finally released on 15 November 1997 after the Strasbourg Court ruled it would be illegal to deport him. It was this decision that forced the Home Office to introduce the 2000 Terrorism Act. According to Home Office statistics, at the end of June 2002, 42 per cent of detainees had been held for less than one month, 21 per cent for one to two months, 18 per cent for between two and four months and 19 per cent for four months or more. Given the long periods for which people may be detained, among the gravest concerns of NGOs working with detainees is the issue of bail. In the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, the British government promised to introduce the right to automatic bail hearings, vital given the length of time individuals may be detained. This provision was, however, never implemented and was withdrawn in the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. Detainees now have to request a bail hearing and many are unaware of this possibility. Furthermore, as people are now often detained on or shortly after arrival, it is difficult for them to find sureties.
While there is no information on the annual totals for detainees, families or children, there is currently (February 2004) capacity for 2260 persons in the UK Detention Estate. Government expansion plans already agreed will increase the capacity to 2996.
6 At the beginning of 2004, 91 per cent of asylum detainees were men. According to Section 38.8 of the Operational Enforcement Manual, only in very exceptional circumstances should pregnant women, those with serious medical conditions, the mentally ill or torture victims be detained. However, pregnant women have been detained for months, even when there is no prospect of early removal, as have people who are HIV positive and others suffering serious psychological problems or suicidal tendencies (United Nations, 2002; Jackson, 2003) .
The Home Office argues that only those believed to be likely to abscond are detained, and usually at the end of the process. To underline this, detention centres have been renamed removal centres. However, the majority of those held in removal centres are eventually released, either because they cannot be removed because of conditions in the country of origin, because travel documents for the persons to be removed cannot be issued, because they are allowed to appeal, because they are released on bail (only in the UK), because they are granted leave to remain on compassionate grounds or because their claim for asylum is eventually allowed. Increasingly organizations such as Bail for Immigration Detainees, National Coalition for Anti-Deportation Campaigns and Barbed Wire Britain are reporting an increase in people detained on arrival and it seems likely that the goals of this policy, for New Labour as much as for the Conservatives before them, is deterrence and the facilitation of removals.
France
Detention in France is governed by Art.35bis de l'ordannance n0.45-2658 du 2 novembre 1945, which states that a foreigner may be detained if the state provides written reasons for the detention, such that the foreigner in question is subject to a removal order, but cannot be removed immediately from the territory of the state, or an attempt has been made to deport and failed. Administrative detention was introduced with the toleration of the Constitutional court on condition that the period of detention would be limited to the time strictly necessary for arranging the departure of the foreigner and secondly, that it would be subject to strict judicial oversight. Once a person has been detained the state prosecutor has to be informed. The foreigner may initially be held for 48 hours, and the foreigner must be informed of his/her rights in a language s/he understands.
Once these 48 hours have elapsed, the detainee may be held for a further five days, which can be renewed again in cases of absolute urgency or a threat of particular gravity to public order, or where it is impossible to execute the removal order as a result of the loss or destruction of travel documents, the dissimulation of identity, or resistance to deportation. These decisions can be appealed, but the appeals are not suspensive. In 1998 a supplementary increase of two days was added. More recently, a new migration law has increased the period a person may be held to 32 days. In a recent interview with the chief of the police aux frontières, M. Débue, he argued that this prolongation was necessary to facilitate the issuance of travel documents, so that the numbers of detainees expelled can be increased. At the end of these periods, if expulsion cannot be affected, the detainee must be released, except where s/he has resisted deportation (Anafé, 2003a) .
Those who resist deportation, or who, having been released and issued with an order to quit the territory, are subsequently rediscovered, may be sentenced to three months detention, and are again liable to deportation. France has the strictest limits on the length of time a person may be held in detention, but conditions are among the worst in Europe, with people being held in overcrowded conditions, without access to sanitation or adequate food (Anafé, 2003a) . People may either be detained in centres de retention administrative (CRA), of which there are 23, or in locaux de retention administrative (LRA).
In addition, the Association Nationale d'Assistance aux Frontières pour les Etrangers (Anafé) have documented hundreds of acts of violence perpetrated by the border police against asylum seekers in the centres, particularly at Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport where the overwhelming majority of people are held (95%) and where 96-98 per cent of asylum claims are lodged. Among concerns listed in a second report (Anafé, 2003b) by the organization are the repeated and manifest refusals to register claims for asylum, the failure to provide information to those detained of their rights, particularly to non-Francophones, the refusal to permit the disembarkation of undocumented passengers from boats when they reach port, the refoulement of people to countries considered safe without allowing them to apply for asylum and restrictions and obstructions of the access of concerned NGOs to the centres. Authorized associations may visit each centre a maximum of eight times in any one year.
Germany
As in France and Britain, detention is an administrative, rather than a penal measure. Any person present in Germany without permission is liable to be detained as are those whose asylum claim has been rejected and who are subject to a deportation. However, the second author has met individuals who have been detained immediately on arrival in Germany when they have asked for asylum, including a 16-year-old boy from the Ivory Coast (Schuster, 2003a) .
In the Aliens Law (Ausländergesetz) two forms of detention are specified. The first is a 'preparation detention' (Vorbereitungshaft- §57 AuslG), which should not be for a period greater than six weeks. The judge must establish when ordering this detention that the person to be detained will be deported within this period-otherwise detention should not occur. 'Secure detention' (Sicherungshaft §57 II, III AuslG) can only be ordered when there are grounds for believing that an individual will abscond-i.e., if that person has already 'disappeared' before being caught again, or where that person has successfully evaded deportation. However, observers note, that frequently the suspicion that someone will abscond is used as grounds to detain. This suspicion is justified by reference to the absence of regular accommodation or the assertion that someone clearly has no intention of voluntarily leaving the country. This latter form of detention is ordered on condition that deportation can be effected within three months (in Berlin, one judge 'sentenced' a detainee to six months). This period can be extended by a further 12 months, in cases where 'the foreigner hinders his deportation' ( §57 Abs.3 AuslG), for example when the detainee refuses the necessary signature for the issue of a new passport or travel documents. As a result, it is possible in extreme cases for detention in Germany to last up to 18 months.
Since 1992, the decision to detain is taken at Federal level, but the individual German states (Länder) are responsible for overseeing detention and the detention centres. As a result conditions vary from state to state. The following information relates exclusively to the situation in Berlin. In 1995, a former women's prison in East Berlin was converted to a detention centre and all detainees are now held there (although until 2000 people were also being detained in the prison Berlin Moabit). In 2000, approximately 250 men and 50 women were incarcerated at any one time and a total of 7000 had been detained during those 12 months. Reflecting the drop in the number of asylum seekers in Germany, the following year this number had sunk to 5000. Those aged between 16-65 years can be detained. Pregnant women are also detained (as they are in Britain and France), but are sent to hospital six weeks before the due date and allowed to remain for six weeks after the birth.
Men and women are accommodated separately in the centre. Cells have concrete tables and benches and can accommodate up to eight people. There are bars outside the windows but also inside the cells making it difficult for the detainees to open the windows themselves. Unlike in Britain, where the wardens are mostly employees of private security firms, in Köpernick they are police officers. Detainees have limited room to move and must ask the police for permission to open a window, smoke a cigarette, or fetch hot water for tea-and permission can be (and sometimes is) refused.
There are no work or training possibilities in Köpernick and detainees are only allowed one hour's exercise in the yard. Visitors can be received but are separated from the detainee by Perspex, and from other visitors/ detainees by a small partition. It is necessary to raise one's voice to be heard, so the noise levels are high and there is no privacy. There is free legal advice available from volunteer lawyers once a week. However, detainees must arrange and pay for their own legal advice. Money and possessions are taken from the detainees on arrival, and any money put towards the cost of detention. Detainees frequently complain that when taken in to custody they are not allowed to take personal possessions with them, so that it is not unusual for detainees to find themselves on release or being deported with only the clothes they stand up in.
In Germany, chaplains from the Jesuit Refugee Service have access to all parts of the centres, but they are overwhelmed by the numbers in their care and deeply concerned by the conditions of the detention centres. Dieter Müller, a chaplain visiting Köpernick detention centre noted that those who were held longest were the African detainees, in part because of difficulties establishing identity. 
Italy
As in France, the maximum period for which someone can be detained pending expulsion has been recently increased in Italy (legge 189/2002 [Bossi-Fini])-this time from 30 to 60 days. 8 Few of those detained in Italy are asylum seekers, most are the so-called clandestini, undocumented migrants. Italy has relatively few asylum seekers, in part because it does not yet have an asylum law (the current draft has been under discussion for at least four years), but also because many of those who want asylum in Europe, enter Italy but hope to claim asylum in Britain, France or Germany. In other cases, people do not understand how to ask for asylum, or are detained on arrival and not offered the chance to claim.
Many of those detained in these centres (between 60% and 95%) are awaiting expulsion following the completion of a penal sentence, which means that their sentence is extended extra-judicially. It is strange that the authorities believe that, having failed to establish the person's identity or nationality while they were serving their sentence they will now be able to do so within 60 days.
The detention centres (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza-CPTA) created originally by legge 40/1998 (Turco-Napolitano), were a novelty in Italian law and are tied directly to expulsions, in that they were opened in order to hold those whose expulsions cannot immediately be executed 9 (Medici Senza Frontiere [MSF] 2004: 14) . If, at the end of 60 days, the deportation cannot be executed, the person detained must be released. In 2002, the Bossi-Fini law (189/2002) created another form of closed centres, identification centres where asylum seekers can be held while their nationality or identity is established, while elements of their claims are verified, or where an application for asylum has been made after entry to the territory, and it is assumed that this claim has been made solely to avoid migration controls or to regularize one's status. Aside from the open reception centres that are designed to provide initial assistance to the sometimes quite large groups of people who are washed up on Italy's shores, there are more than a dozen closed centres around Italy.
These centres range from converted schools, barracks, freight containers in railway yards (e.g. in Turin), to purpose built structures and accommodate between 60 and 180 people, though Rome 'Ponte Galeria' holds 300 and there are plans to expand the centre at Caltanissetta to hold 400. The containers are particularly unsuitable accommodation, being unbearable both in summer and winter. Three of the centres (at Trapani, Lamezia Terme and Turin) should be closed immediately according to the report (MSF, 2004: 190) , because of their 'absolute and indisputable inadequacy' in every respect.
MSF reported numerous cases of self-harm in every centre visited (16 in total), including the new, purpose-built centres where conditions were better, and some attempted suicides (e.g. two in Bologna). None of these cases were referred to mental health services. Other concerns relate to the excessive prescribing of tranquillisers 10 and painkillers, a failure to make use of social services (including psychological support) in the local area, the lack of activities, leading to boredom, depression and tension in the centres, lack of adequate medical care or screening for infectious diseases.
The staff of the centres receive little or no training and tend to learn 'on the job'. The centres are managed by members of the Red Cross, Caritas (a Catholic charity), or the Misericordia, who are responsible for caring for the detainees. Particular services, such as medical care, legal advice or catering are 'bought in' or are provided by volunteers. There is also a police presence, and these are responsible for maintaining order and sometimes the roles of the two are confused, not least because of the behaviour of the management.
The MSF report noted (2004: 189) that while practices varied from centre to centre, certain deficiencies remained constant across the system, and were not dependent on the physical structures of the management team in the centres, but were due instead to the practice of administrative detention itself. The inefficiency of a system designed to facilitate removals is clear when one notes that a significant number of people detained have already been detained once, twice or more often, this is especially true of those detained in Rome. The MSF report concluded that the concept of administrative detention, such as that of the CPTA, needed fundamental reform and the search for alternatives, given that it did not and could not contribute to the management of irregular migration flows, but led to violations of human rights.
Discussion
Whereas this article sets out to provide evidence of an emerging culture of control adversely affecting asylum seekers, there remain a few items worthy of further consideration. First, some contextual discussion is in order that may improve our understanding of asylum seekers as a constructed political problem. Second, it is important to realize that the societal and political reactions to asylum seekers are far from monolithic since there exist key differences in how government entities shape their responses to perceived threats along with often heated exchanges between (and within) political parties, the courts, and human rights activists. Finally, in light of the numerous tactics deployed by governments, attention must also be turned to the multitude of carceral establishments aimed at controlling those fleeing persecution. At the heart of these developments, to be sure, are the politics of movement, or what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as the 'global hierarchy of mobility' in which freedom of movement is a trait of the 'dominant' and the 'strictest possible constraints' are forced upon the 'dominated ' (1998: 69; Pratt, 2000; Malloch and Stanley, 2005) . Indeed, De Giorgi (2005) makes a similar point that even in the wake of globalization, borders still sustain their symbolic and material impact against the circulation of some classifications of people, most notably asylum seekers and underprivileged non-western workers. 'Therefore, what we witness is not so much the disappearance of borders, as their fragmentation and flexibilisation: these no longer operate as unitary and fixed entities; instead, borders are becoming flexible instruments for the reproduction of a hierarchical division between deserving and undeserving populations, wanted and unwanted others' (De Giorgi, 2005: 3) .
In an effort to contextualize the phenomenon of asylum seekers depicted as a threat and menace to nation states as well as to local communities, it is useful to acknowledge a growing body of research drawing on social constructionism. In the US, recent analysis displays the utility of the societal reaction perspective in interpreting processes and consequences of moral panic over immigrants and asylum seekers in during the 1990s (Welch, 2002 (Welch, , 2003 . That work demonstrates how exaggerated claims were used to justify an official crackdown on so-called illegal aliens, creating a greater reliance on detention. In the UK, moral panic has generated similar campaigns against asylum seekers. According to Cohen, 'in media, public, and political discourse in Britain the distinctions between immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers have become hopelessly blurred ' (2002: xviii) . Furthermore, asylum issues in the UK 'are subsumed under the immigration debate which in turn is framed by the general categories of race, race relations and ethnicity' (p. xviii). Beginning in the 1990s, growing numbers of asylum seekers were met with hostility in the UK and throughout Europe (Joly et al., 1997; Sassen, 1999) . Many of those persons faced accusations of being bogus asylum seekers and therefore not entitled to compassion or safe refuge (Robinson, 2003; Schuster, 2003a Schuster, , 2003b . As Cohen explains:
Governments and media start with a broad public consensus that first, we must keep out as many refugee-type of foreigners as possible; second, these people lie to get themselves accepted; third, that strict criteria of eligibility and therefore tests of credibility must be used. For two decades, the media and the political elites of all parties have focused attention on the notion of 'genuineness'. This culture of disbelief penetrates the whole system. So 'bogus' refugees and asylum seekers have not really been driven from their home countries because of persecution, but are merely 'economic' migrants, attracted to the 'Honey Pot' or 'Soft Touch Britain'. (2002: xix; see also Oxfam, 2001; Refaie, 2001) Despite similarities among the US and European nations in their harsh treatment of those fleeing persecution, there persist differences in social constructionism. In a related study that extracts the nuances in moral panic over asylum seekers, we identified distinctions between American and British constructions (Welch and Schuster, 2005) . Among the most striking, we discovered that the invention and dramatization of so-called bogus asylum seekers as a popular stereotype is much more of a British phenomenon than an American one; indeed, the perceived threat of asylum seekers in the US is quietly contained within government agencies and not a publicly shared construction.
That divergence is recognized by Cohen who points to a discursive formulae of moral panic; specifically, some panics are transparent and others opaque. Societal reaction to asylum seeking in the UK manifests as a transparent moral panic since 'anyone can see what's happening' (Cohen, 2002: viii) . Whereas there have been spikes of panic over foreigners (most recently those perceived as being Arab and Muslim) and undocumented workers (generally Latino) in the US before and since September 11, the putative problem of asylum seeking does not resonate in the public mind. Privately, however, American government officials have quietly embarked on a detention campaign similar to those in Britain. Whereas such detention practices were in full swing before 9/11, the war on terror provides American authorities with an urgent rationale for greater reliance on that form of control; specifically, US government officials insist that policies calling for the detention of asylum seekers serve national security interests (Cole, 2003; Ratner, 2003) .
Historical forces, of course, commonly shape societal reaction to asylum seekers, and there major differences between the US and UK are also evident. In brief, American culture retains its identity as an immigrant nation whereas Britain continues to be influenced by colonial politics (Cohen, 1994; Welch and Schuster, 2005) . Beyond those historical distinctions, it is important to address some contemporary features of British culture that remain relatively insignificant in the US, most notably the role of the tabloid media. Certainly, in the US media sensationalism continues to influence popular and political views of crime and other social problems (Best, 1999; Glassner, 1999) . Though by comparison, the degree to which British tabloid journalism penetrates politics, thereby shaping discourse over the putative threat of asylum seekers, is virtually unmatched by any American news outlet. Negative reactions to migrants and asylum seekers have a long history in British political culture. Moreover, 'successive British governments have not only led and legitimated public hostility, but spoken with a voice indistinguishable from the tabloid press' (Cohen, 2002: xix) . For instance, in response to a rabid and concerted campaign in the tabloids, the Labour government in 2002 reacted to a fictional crisis by shutting down the Sangatte refugee camp on the French side of the English Tunnel, intercepting boats transporting illegal migrants, and expediting deportation (see Schuster, 2003b Schuster, , 2003c Cowell, 2004; New York Times, 5 April 2004) .
Due to the interlocking of tabloid media, politics, and public opinion, the detention of asylum seekers in the UK conforms to a European wide phenomenon of incarcerating foreigners, or 'suitable enemies' who symbolically represent an array of social anxieties (Christie, 1986 This process is powerfully reinforced and amplified by the media and by politicians of all stripes, eager to surf the xenophobic wave that has been sweeping across Europe since the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. Sincerely or cynically, directly or indirectly, but with ever more banality, they have succeeded in forging an amalgam of immigration, illegality, and criminality. (1999: 219; see Melossi, 1998; Calavita, 2005) In the realm of asylum seekers, it is important to realize that the recognition of the status of refugee is often based on arbitrary evaluation of the nations of destination. There, official decisions commonly are determined by political and economic contingencies to which humanitarian principles are easily subordinated (Young, 2003b) . De Giorgi (2005) also reminds us that frequently those are the same governments whose 'humanitarian wars' (e.g., Iraq, former-Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Somalia) are at least partly responsible for the humanitarian emergencies from which asylum seekers and refugees try to escape:
A clear example is offered by the policies adopted by the Italian government with Kosovo refugees. During the Kosovo war, Italy recognised the status of 'refugees' to all people coming from that region, offering them 'temporary protection'. However, as soon as military operations ceased, and the humanitarian emergency exploded, the Italian government changed suddenly its former provisions, turning thousands of refugees into illegal immigrants. (p. 10) Correspondingly, European countries have been known to impose political and economic pressures on undemocratic governments so as to prevent their victimized populations from fleeing to the West for sanctuary, or to readmit and refoule asylum seekers in transit. A clear example would be the return of thousands of migrants, including potential asylum seekers by Italy to Libya in and since the summer of 2004; Libya is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention (see Horowitz, 2004; New York Times, 20 October 2004) .
Although there are both clear and nuanced distinctions in how a culture of control manifests in the US and Europe, particularly in the realm of social constructionism, shared consequences persist, most notably the reliance on detention as a coercive measure of social control. In each of the nations examined, there are significant developments worth noting: growing detention populations and longer periods of confinement. Moreover, those governments are increasing their efforts to expand detention capacity. Still, even more differences arise in the nature of the carceral systems implemented by governments. In the US, immigration authorities rely on its own detention facilities along with a network of private and state jails where asylum seekers co-mingle with prisoners charged (and convicted) of criminal offences. Generally, conditions of confinement are punitive and, particularly in the case of private facilities, there lacks adequate monitoring that would otherwise hold companies accountable for the abuse and mistreatment of detainees.
Similar detention patterns and complaints occur in Europe. Britain, along with its multi-tiered detention and removal system, has adopted a dispersal program, comparable to those in Germany and The Netherlands. According to dispersal, asylum seekers are placed in local communities scattered throughout the UK. That policy was met initially with considerable controversy insofar as the neighborhoods selected for dispersal were inner-city sections marked by social and economic deprivation. Some communities offer genuine support, however, there also are incidents of racist attacks on asylum seekers. 'While tensions in these cities have denoted a considerable amount of racial intolerance, they have centered on perceived threats to material resources in the areas of social deprivation' (Malloch and Stanley, 2005: 61; see Robinson, 2003; Travis, 2003) . Still, even among the well-intentioned and seemingly benevolent programs intended to assist asylum seekers, the prevailing governmental response to those fleeing persecution is a combination of containment, punishment, and deterrence-all of which are chief elements of a culture of control driven by perceptions of difference and putative threat.
Conclusion
While elaborating on his views of the culture of control, David Garland notes that the conservative shift toward greater social control is not a generalized phenomenon but rather one targeting particular groups and their behaviors. The new conservatism issues 'a message exhorting everyone to return to the values of family, work, abstinence, and self control, but in practice its real moral disciplines fastened onto the behaviour of unemployed workers, welfare mothers, immigrants, offenders, and drug users' (Garland, 2001: 99-100) . As the culture of control tightens the grip on those marginalized by economic conditions, it perpetuates fear across the social spectrum, enabling the criminology of the other to divert attention from progressive criminologies. The popular notion of criminals-and asylum seekers-transcends both reality and humanity, becoming imaginary figures that political conservatives manipulate and exploit (Kaye, 1998; Oxfam, 2001; Refaie, 2001) . As a result, harsh criminal justice tactics are viewed as practical and rational since they are aimed at taking so-called dangerous persons 'out of circulation' (Douglas, 1992; Joly et al., 1997; Wacquant, 1999) . The culture of control resists attempts to reevaluate tough on crime strategies that would reveal the fallacies of labeling and the detrimental effects of mass imprisonment (Welch, 2005b) .
Fear of crime is almost indistinguishable from fear of strangers (Hale, 1996; Glassner, 1999; Garland, 2001) . Taking into account the currency of the criminology of the other embodied in the culture of control, asylum seekers-as social outsiders-are not only met with suspicion but their detention, although unnecessary, is understood to be appropriate. This article aims to remind criminologists and penologists of the importance of taking a strong interest in the detention of asylum seekers. It is certainly within the scope of our commitments to know precisely who and under which circumstances the government is detaining. Moreover, there exist ethical responsibilities to challenge the state for engaging in detention practices that violate international law and human rights. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2002, issued an advisory opinion denouncing the policy of generally detaining asylum seekers. By doing so, the UNHCR stressed that such detention is contrary to the norms and principles of international refugee law. Still, in rare instances in which a government detains an asylum seeker, it should be for the expressed purpose of undertaking a preliminary interview and not for the entire duration it may take to determine the merits of the petition. The UNHCR advisory also states that subjecting asylum seekers to detention based on their national origin is discriminatory, since it is contrary to Article 3 of the UN Refugee Convention. Correspondingly, the decision to detain is arbitrary if it lacks an individualized analysis of the reasons for detention (Guebre-Christos, 2002; see Simon, 1998; Mailman and YaleLoehr, 2003) .
In sum, this work demonstrates the expansion of a culture of control from the US and UK to continental Europe particularly in the realm of detaining asylum seekers. While remaining mindful of the dynamics of moral panic adversely affecting people pushed to the margins of society, it is imperative to recognize key moments that make those groups even more vulnerable (Cohen, 1985 (Cohen, , 2001 Kanstroom, 2000) . The events of September 11 have contributed tremendously to popular fear of outsiders, further enabling governments to clampdown on those who are easy to identify and easy to scapegoat (Weber, 2002; Welch, 2006) . With those considerations in full view, it is reasonable to conclude that some aspects of the so-called war on terror manifests more as social-and immigrationcontrol rather than as crime control, leaving in its wake an array of human rights abuses (Fekete, 2002; Cole, 2003; Schmid, 2003) .
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1 In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act that harmonized domestic law with international standards. Drawing from the United Nations Convention on Refugees, the new law defined a refugee as a person 'who is unwilling or unable to, or is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion'. Under the Refugee Act, such an individual is entitled to political asylum as a recognized human right. The only requirement that ought to determine granting asylum to such a person is his or her endangerment. 2 The escalating penal climate and growing prison population trends in European nations are well documented (Kommer, 1994 (Kommer, , 2004 Tournier, 2000) . 3 Much of the European data used here was gathered during a project undertaken by the second author, examining processes of inclusion and exclusion in Europe. Though the four countries in the study (Britain, France, Germany and Italy) have very different migration histories and models of citizenship there is a marked convergence between them in terms of the mechanisms used in the pursuit of tighter border controls. 4 In fiscal year 2003, DHS reports that 272,625 people applied for asylum in the US. In the same period, the government denied 134,730 petitions for asylum, resulting in deportation (see Geniesse 2003) . 5 While Operation Liberty Shield was launched as a comprehensive national plan designed to protect citizens, secure infrastructure and, most importantly, deter terrorist attacks, the initiative was terminated after only one month of operation. It is believed that the government quietly abandoned the program in the face of intense pressure from human rights organizations. Still, arriving asylum seekers from the designated countries and territories continue to be subject to mandatory detention upon their arrival in the US under the 1996 expedited removal law. Although asylum seekers from those nations are now technically eligible to apply for parole, it is unclear how many will actually be released (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 2003). 6 The Home Office no longer publishes these statistics and instead they must be obtained through the good offices of Members of Parliament who address a Written Question to the Minister at intervals in order to get updates. These figures are then passed to interested organizations (in this case, the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns who made them available to the authors). 7 Interview with Liza Schuster: Berlin, 28 October 2002. 8 This section relies on visits to two centres in Puglia by the second author in 2001 and the report by Medici Senza Frontiere (2004). 9 Legge 39/1990 (Martelli) had introduced for the first time specific procedures for deporting foreign citizens. 10 The report noted at Trapani, for example, tranquillisers were used to sedate the detainees, some of whom were not lucid during the visit to the centre.
